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COMMENTS
INFORMED CONSENT IN KENTUCKY AFTER THE
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE AND
CLAIMS ACT OF 1976
I.

INTRODUCTION

The medical malpractice problem has received much attention in both the popular' and academic 2 presses in recent
years as a result of greatly increased litigation. An important
consequence of this litigation has been its effect on the cost and
availability of medical malpractice insurance, 3 itself a crucial
problem because of the dual role insurance plays in malpractice litigation. As a government report has observed:
"[Insurance] indemnifies health care providers, thereby protecting their assets against major losses, and it provides the
major source of compensation for most patients who are injured
due to a provider's negligence."'
In answer to this problem, many states have enacted legislation to create conditions favorable to local professional liability insurers.5 In 1976, Kentucky joined these states with pas'See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, June 9, 1975, at 58; U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 20,
1975, at 53.
2 See, e.g., D. LoUISELL & H.

WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

(1973); Waltz &

Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 628 (1970).
In addition to problems in obtaining insurance, the threat of liability has allegedly caused many physicians to engage in the practice of defensive medicine. Positive
defensive medicine consists of conducting tests or diagnostic procedures for the purpose of defending against potential legal liability. A physician commits negative defensive medicine, on the other hand, when he refuses to conduct tests or treatments that
he would have otherwise prescribed because of his fear of a later suit. U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, PUB. No. (OS) 73-88, MEDICAL MALPRACrICE: REPORT
OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE at 14-15 (1973) [hereinafter

cited as HEW

REPORT].

Id. at 38.
Some of these laws provide for the state to insure physicians who are unable to
obtain any liability coverage from private sources. See, e.g., IND. STAT. ANN § 16-9.5-8
(1976); LA. REv. STAT. § 40-1299.46 (Supp. 1975). Other legislation allows doctors to
own and manage insurance companies. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.52 (Supp.
1976); IOWA CODE ANN. § 519.1 (Supp. 1975). Some states have created compensation
funds to cover catastrophic losses above certain limits. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
40, § 1301.701(c) (Supp. 1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 655.27 (Supp. 1976). In addition to
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sage of the Medical Malpractice Insurance and Claims Act'
[hereinafter cited as the Act]. This legislation addresses the
medical malpractice issue in at least three ways. First, the
principal section of the Act 7 establishes a patient's compensation fund that provides "'umbrella' coverage for each physician and hospital for any award or settlement against them in
excess of $100,000 for any one incident, or in excess of $300,000
for all claims within one year."' Under this section, health care
providers should not need as much liability insurance as they
have needed in the past. Since higher insurance costs are ultimately borne by the public, this provision could result in lower
health care costs. It should also minimize the potential liability
of private insurers thus encouraging them to continue insuring
Kentucky's health care providers at reasonable rates.
Second, the Act makes a minimal commitment to the reduction of malpractice itself. Section 7 of the Act provides that
the Commissioner of Insurance shall forward, after the settlement or disposition of a malpractice claim, a detailed report
"to the appropriate licensure board or regulatory agency for
laws that meet particular insurance needs, some states have modified tort doctrines
frequently used to impose liability on the physician. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40,
§ 1301.103 (Supp. 1975); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3417 (Supp. 1976).
1 Ky. ACTs ch. 163 (1976) [hereinafter cited as the Act]. Besides the Act, the
legislature also passed a separate act that established a Joint Underwriters Association (JUA). The JUA protects health care providers against total cancellation of liability insurance by mandatorily joining all liability insurers in the state at the request of
the Commissioner of Insurance to supply such coverage. Ky. ACTs ch. 164 (1976). For
further discussion of this act, see Clark, Kentucky Law Survey-Medical Malpractice,
supra.
I Ky. REv. STAT. § 304.40-330 (Supp. 1976) [hereinafter cited as KRS]. In September, 1976, the Franklin Circuit Court ruled unconstitutional those provisions of

this section that require physicians and hospitals to contribute to the patient's compensation fund and that allow the state to pay claims from its general fund to the
extent that the patient's compensation fund is deficient. This ruling has been appealed
to the Kentucky Supreme Court. William D. Hall, M.D., et al v. Harold B. McGuffey,
Commissioner of Insurance, et al, No. SC-94-MR.
a GOVERNOR'S HOSPITAL AND PHYSICIANS PROFESSIONAL LIBILITY INSURANCE ADvisoRy COMMITFEE, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR, § II, at 7 [hereinafter cited as GOVERNOR's
REPORT]. This special committee, chaired by the Commissioner of the Department of
Insurance, was created to study "the problem of rising costs and declining availability
of medical malpractice liability insurance." Letter from Harold B. McGuffey, Commissioner, Dep't of Insurance to Julian M. Carroll, Governor of Kentucky, November
26, 1975, in GOVERNOR's REPORT at 1. The final report of the Committee in bill form

was enacted by the General Assembly with minor changes. The committee included
members of both the legal and medical professional communities.
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review of the fitness of the health care provider to practice his
profession." 9
Finally, and most importantly, the Act creates special procedural and substantive legal standards for handling malpractice litigation. Unlike the insurance provisions of the Act,
which are remedial in nature and deal only with the consequences of malpractice litigation, the special legal standards
created attempt to make it more difficult to bring a successful
malpractice suit.'" One important procedural change, for example, prohibits the recitation of alleged damages in an ad
damnum clause in any pleading.' The plaintiff may assert only
that the damages are in excess of any amount necessary to
establish jurisdiction. The purpose of this change is to prevent
the defendant from being cast in an unfavorable light before
the general public."2
One substantive legal change from existing case law requires a writing signed by the health care provider prior to the
imposition of liability for breach of warranty for a particular
result.'" Prior Kentucky case law only required that the war' Ky.AcTS

ch. 163, § 7 (1976) [KRS § 304.40-310(2) (Supp. 1976)].

10Limiting claims by creating special substantive and procedural legal standards

is viewed as one way of increasing the availability of malpractice insurance. This
technique has been criticized, however, because it reduces "all claims without any
distinction based on merit." Letter from W. Patrick Stallard, Asst. Atty. Gen., to
Harold B. McGuffey, Chairman, Hospital and Physicians Professional Liability Insurance Advisory Committee, November 14, 1975, in GOVERNOR' REPORT, § VI, at 2.
" KRS § 304.40-270 (Supp. 1976) states:
In any action for damages for malpractice, the ad damnum clause or
prayer for damages in any pleading shall not recite any sum as alleged
damages other than an allegation that damages are in excess of any minimum dollar amount necessary to establish the jurisdiction of the court;
provided, however, that all parties shall have the right to advise the trier of
fact as to what amounts are fair and reasonable as shown by the evidence.
Another important procedural change is KRS § 304.40-290 which states:
In any malpractice action in which more than one health care provider
is named as a defendant concerning a single injury, the jury shall be instructed that it may apportion damages in different percentages against the
defendants or may return a verdict of joint and several liability against two
(2) or more defendants.
There are other sections in the Act, such as KRS § 304.40-280 (advance payments on
behalf of health care provider to the claimant), which could be arguably classified as
either procedural or substantive.
12 GOVERNOR's REPORT, § II, at 1-2.
' KRS § 304.40-300 (Supp. 1976) states:
No malpractice liability shall be imposed upon any health care provider
on the basis of an alleged breach of any guaranty, warranty, contract or
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ranty of cure be express.14 The statutory standard would presumably not allow imposition of liability in a contract action
where the physician had breached an express oral warranty of
cure.
An alteration of substantive legal doctrine that will have
even greater impact on future litigation, however, is that part
of the Act which deals with informed consent." This comment
will analyze and interpret Kentucky's informed consent statute
with respect to the historical development of the informed consent issue and the probable impact it will have on future malpractice litigation.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF INFORMED CONSENT

Battery or Negligence

A.

At common law one who intentionally touched another
without that person's consent was liable for battery,"6 a principle which has been applied by patients in the medical context
since the early 20th century. 7 In Tabor v. Scobee,18 the then
Kentucky Court of Appeals followed this rule by recognizing an
action for battery where a surgeon performed a particular surgical procedure which went beyond the specific treatment for
which consent was obtained.19 Generally, where the physician
has obtained no consent whatsoever, or where, as in Tabor, he
exceeds the scope of treatment to which consent was given, it
is clear that a battery action is proper. However, if consent is
invalidated because of the physician's failure to disclose a particular risk, and such nondisclosure proximately results in injury to the patient, negligence rather than battery may be the
assurance of results to be obtained from any procedure undertaken in the
course of providing health care, unless such guaranty, warranty, contract or
assurance is in writing and signed by the provider.
" See Hackworth v. Hart, 474 S.W.2d 377 (Ky. 1971).
, See note 56 infra.
" W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTs § 9, at 34 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as

PRossER].
See, e.g., Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
"254 S.W.2d 474 (Ky. 1951).
' Id. at 475. If an emergency exists, however, then consent is not required. Also
if the patient is a minor, the consent of a parent or guardian will suffice. 254 S.W.2d
at 476.
"'
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proper action. Thus, in Cobbs v. Grant,2" the California Su-

preme Court noted:
[W]hen the patient consents to certain treatment and the
doctor performs that treatment but an undisclosed inherent
complication with a low probability occurs, no intentional
deviation from the consent given appears; rather, the doctor
in obtaining consent may have failed to meet his due care
duty to disclose pertinent information. In that situation, the
action should be pleaded in negligence.2 '
Theoretically, however, a battery might also be alleged
since that tort is consummated at the moment of touching
without consent.2 2 Accordingly, in Bang v. Charles T. Miller
Hospital,3 the Minnesota Supreme Court allowed a battery
action where the plaintiff had not been properly apprised of the
risks of the surgical procedure to which he consented. 4
The determination of whether an action is one for battery
or negligence will have practical importance for some collateral
issues. First, in a battery action the plaintiff may not be required to produce expert testimony since the issue posed is
whether consent was given at all, or whether the practitioner
exceeded the scope of consent.2 If, however, the sufficiency of
the disclosure of risks and alternatives by the physician in
obtaining consent is at issue in a negligence action, it is clear
in many jurisdictions that expert testimony is required to determine the scope of the physician's duty to disclose. 6
Second, the statute of limitations may vary depending
upon whether the action is in battery or negligence. In Kentucky, an action for battery must be brought within 1 year after
the cause of action accrued.Y In a negligence action for mal" 502 P.2d
21 Id. at 8,

n

1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
104 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
See PROSSER § 9.

23

88 N.W.2d 186 (Minn. 1958).

21 Id. at 190.
21 See Comment, Informed Consent: A Malpractice Headache, 47 Cou.-KX1'
L.
REv. 242, 246 (1971); Comment, Informed Consent as a Theory of MedicalLiability,
1970 Wis. L. REv. 879, 884, noted in Comment, Informed Consent in New York Under
the Medical MalpracticeInsurance Act, 4 HoFSm L. Rav. 701, 705-06 (1976).
2 See text accompanying notes 33-39 infra.
2 KRS § 413.140 (Supp. 1976) states in relevant part:
(1) The following actions shall be commenced within one (1) year after
the cause of action accrued:
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practice, the statute of limitations is also 1 year but the cause
of action does not accrue until the injury is discovered, with the
provision that no action can commence after 5 years from the
time the alleged negligent act occurred.2s
In most jurisdictions it has been settled that where there
was a failure to disclose a known risk of treatment, the action
is properly pleaded in negligence rather than battery. 9 In
Holton v. Pfingst,rs the Kentucky Court adopted this majority
position. The opinion states:
[W]e are persuaded that the prevailing view to the effect
that the action, regardless of its form, is in reality one for
negligence in failing to conform to a proper professional standard is the soundest approach.'
It appears that the Court will continue to recognize a battery
or where the treataction where there is no consent whatsoever,
32
ment exceeds the consent given.
B.

What is the Scope of the Physician'sDuty to Disclose?

Since most informed consent questions now arise in the
context of a negligence case, the key issue has become the
(a) An action for an injury to the person of the plaintiff, or of her
husband, his wife, child, ward, apprentice or servant.
2 KRS § 413.140 (Supp. 1976) states in relevant part:
(1) The following actions shall be commenced within one (1) year after
the cause of action accrued:
(e) An action against a physician, surgeon, dentist, or hospital licensed
pursuant to KRS chapter 216 for negligence or malpractice.
(2) In respect to the action referred to in paragraph (e) of subsection (1)
of this section, the cause of action shall be deemed to accrue at the time the
injury is first discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have
been discovered; Provided That [sic] such action shall be commenced
within five (5) years from the date on which the alleged negligent act or
omission is said to have occurred.
21 PRossER § 18, at 106. See, e.g., Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965);
Watson v. Clutts, 136 S.E.2d 617 (N.C. 1964).
" 534 S.W.2d 786 (Ky. 1975).
" Id. at 788.
2 Nowhere in Holton is the battery principle of Tabor v. Scobee, 254 S.W.2d 474
(Ky. 1953), either expressly or impliedly overruled. In fact, the careful distinction
made in applying negligence theory only to those cases regarding the failure to disclose
a risk implies a reaffirmation of the Tabor principle. See Holton v. Pfingst, 534 S.W.2d
at 788 (Ky. 1975).
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standard by Which a physician's duty to disclose information
to the patient will be measured. There are two basic standards
against which most courts have measured the adequacy of the
disclosure: the medical community standard and the material
risk standard.
1.

The Medical Community Standard

The medical community standard, the majority position,
is an outgrowth of the traditional "locality rule" which sought
to protect "practitioners in rural localities . . .[who did not
have] the same high degree of skill, or knowledge, or education
'
that-may be found in large cities and populous communities."
In Di Filippo v. Preston,34 the Delaware Supreme Court framed
the locality rule in terms of the informed consent issue:
Whether or not a physician or surgeon is under a duty to warn
a patient of the possibility of a specific adverse result of a
proposed treatment depends upon the circumstances of the
particular case, and of the general practice with respect to
such cases followed by the medical profession in the locality.3
The test is objective in that it compares the disclosure practice
of the defendent-physician with those of reasonable physicians
composing the medical profession of the locality. It is based on
a standard of professional conduct which may have evolved
from traditional models of the doctor-patient relationship or in
response to other biases of the medical community."
Burk v. Foster, 69 S.W. 1096 (Ky. 1902). See 70 C.J.S. § 43, at 952:
The theory supporting the rule is that a physician or surgeon in a small
community not having the same opportunity and resources for keeping
abreast of the advances in his profession should not be held to the same
standard of care and skill as that employed by physicians and surgeons in
large cities.
Many commentators, however, argue that modern communications advances have
eliminated the relative isolation of the rural practitioner and that the rule should no
longer be rigidly applied. See Nations and Surgent, Medical Malpractice and the
Locality Rule, 14 S. TEx. L.J. 129 (1973). But see King and Coe, The Wisdom of the
Strict Locality Rule, 3 BALT. L. REv. 221 (1974).
3,173 A.2d 333 (Del. 1961).
11Id. at 339. For other courts adopting the medical community standard, see, e.g.,
Shetton v. Rochelle, 409 P.2d 74 (Ariz. App. 1965), modified on othergrounds,411 P.2d
45 (Ariz. 1966); Ditlow v. Kaplan, 181 So. 2d 226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965). Williams
v. Menehan, 379 P.2d 292 (Kan. 1963); Roberts v. Young, 119 N.W.2d 627 (Mich.
1963).
31See Schneyer, Informed Consent and the Danger of Bias in the Formation of
33
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Also, since the standard for disclosure is based on local
professional custom, the plaintiff has the burden of producing
an expert witness who will testify that the defendant-physician
did not disclose what a reasonable physician under the circumstances would have disclosed.3 7 The expense and confusion of
a "battle" between expert witnesses has prompted some courts
to reject the community standard test.3 8 However, even if the
plaintiff can produce expert testimony to establish the physician's failure to meet the community standard, he must still
prove that the nondisclosure caused the injury; that is, had the
physician disclosed the risk, as required by the medical community standard, the plaintiff would not have undergone the
treatment.3 9 Thus, the medical community standard poses an

additional legal hurdle for the plaintiff because he must produce expert testimony and rely on a legal standard of disclosure
created by the medical community itself.
2.

The Material Risk Standard

The material risk standard focuses on what a reasonable
patient needs to know. It recognizes that a patient's right of
self-determination cannot be satisfied by a disclosure standard
MedicalDisclosurePractices, 1976 Wi. L. REv. 124. The medical community standard

is comparable to the traditional doctor-patient model where the patient is the passive
participant and the doctor may decide what to disclose on a basis other than the
patient's right to choose. The material risk standard exemplifies a participatory relationship between patient and doctor, one that is based on mutual cooperation rather
than a parent-child, or active-passive pattern. Riskin, Informed Consent: Looking for
the Action, 1975 ILL. L. FORuM 580.
11 Govin v. Hunter, 374 P.2d 421, 424 (Wyo. 1962). See Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d 1084
(1973). Although lay witnesses cannot establish whether the disclosure meets the medical community standard, they can testify as to the fact of disclosure. Natanson v.
Kline, 354 P.2d 670, 673 (Kan. 1960).
' Zeleznik v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 366 N.Y.S.2d 163, 171 (1975). Also
some commentators and courts have noted the unwillingness of physicians to testify
as experts against other physicians. See, e.g., Comment, Medical Malpractice-The
"Locality Rule" and the "Conspiracyof Silence", 22 S.C.L. Rxv. 810 (1970). In Cooper
v. Roberts, 286 A.2d 647, 650 (Pa. 1971), the court noted:
[A]s a practical matter, we must consider the plaintiff's difficulty in finding
a physician who would breach the "community of silence" by testifyng
against the interest of one of his professional colleagues.
Even if expert testimony is available, some courts have challenged the view that a
standard for disclosure among physicians does in fact exist. See, e.g., Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
1' See generally, PROSSER § 30.
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dictated by the professional medical community. In
Canterbury v. Spence," the leading case adopting the material
risk standard, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia stated:
The scope of the physician's communications to the patient,
then, must be measured by the patient's need, and that need
is the information material to the decision. Thus, the test for
determining whether a particular peril must be divulged is its
materiality to the patient's decision.4'
In Wilkinson v. Vesey,42 the Rhode Island Supreme Court
adopted this standard and further defined a material risk as
one to which a reasonable person in plaintiff's position would
attach significance in making the decision to undergo treatment.43
As with the medical community standard, the defendantphysician will be held liable for a particular nondisclosure only
if the patient would not have undergone the treatment had the
risk been known to him." In making this finding of causation
most courts have adopted an objective standard which focuses
on what a "prudent person in the patient's position [would]
have decided if adequately informed of all significant perils."4
If the scope of disclosure is not based on professional custom, but rather upon the material risk standard, then expert
testimony is generally not required." Lay testimony is suffi40464 F.2d

772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
11Id. at 786-87. Although this standard may appear to place an undue burden
upon the physician, the requirement is mitigated by several exceptions. For instance,
"there is no need to disclose risks that are likely to be known by the average patient
or that are in fact known to the patient usually because of a past experience with the
procedure in question." Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676, 689 (R.I. 1972). Also, if the
patient is unconscious and in imminent danger, the physician incurs no obligation to
obtain consent. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d at 788. Likewise, if the "risk-disclosure
poses such a threat or detriment to the patient as to become unfeasible or contraindicated from a medical point of view" then consent is not required. Id. at 789.
42 295 A.2d 676 (R.I. 1972).
11Id. at 689.
11 Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515 (1972).
'1 Id. at 11-12, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515-16. Courts have rejected the subjective standard because it would place the "physician in jeopardy of the plaintiff's hindsight and
bitterness." Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790-91 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See Cobbs
v. Grant, 502 P.2d at 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
" In Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.2d 647, 651 (Pa. 1971), the court stated:
There is no need to extend the requirement of expert testimony into areas
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cient because the medical community standard bears no relationship to the amount or type of information that a reasonable
patient would need to make an informed choice."
3.

The Kentucky Position:Holton v. Pfingst

5 a 1975 case, the Court addressed the
In Holton v. Pfingst,1
informed consent issue in a negligence action for the first time.
In that case, Beatrice B. Holton lost the sight of one eye during
what had otherwise seemed a routine operation. At trial she
alleged that Dr. Pfingst had failed to inform her adequately of
the potential risks and that had she known of the risks she
would not have consented to the operation.49 Mrs. Holton did
not produce any expert testimony, and at the conclusion of her
proof the trial judge directed a verdict for the defendant.
On appeal, both parties focused on the primary evidentiary issue of whether expert testimony was required to determine the scope of the physician's duty to disclose." The Court,
however, in an opinion by Chief Justice Reed, held that it was
"unnecessary to determine whether expert evidence should be

required. . . -", Instead, the Court sought to relate the disclo-

sure standard to what it called the "overall policy consideration."
where no technical expertise is necessary. Determination of what a reasonable man would do or consider significant within the context of a particular
set of facts is standard fare for jurors, for which they need no expert assistance.
In addition, see Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676, 688 (R.I. 1972).
" Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.2d 647, 650 (Pa. 1971).
4 534 S.W.2d 786 (Ky. 1975).
" Brief for Appellant at 13, Holton v. Pfingst, 534 S.W.2d 786 (Ky. 1975).
In regard to the necessity of expert testimony, the appellant argued:
We recognize that there are certain procedures and practices where the
matters are complicated and of [sic] technical nature that the standard of
care is established by what is usually and customarily done by skillful practitioners in the field. We do not believe that the facts of this case fall within
that rule.
Brief for Appellant at 21, Holton v. Pfingst, 534 S.W.2d 786 (Ky. 1975). But Dr. Pfingst
argued:
[A] duty to disclose in order to obtain informed consent is a matter of
medical judgment and requires evidence from expert medical witnesses as
to what a reasonable practitioner should do under similar circumstances.
Brief for Appellee at 10, Holton v. Pfingst, 534 S.W. 2d 786 (1975).
11534 S.W.2d at 789.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65

[Since] a physician ordinarily is not liable for an honest
mistake in judgment, when he follows acceptable medical
standards for examination . . . , then the extent of disclosure relevant to securing the patient's consent must be evaluated in terms of what the physician knew or should have
known at the time he recommended the treatment to the
patient.
. . . There is no evidence, lay or expert, that he failed
to disclose that which he knew or should have known ...
[H]e was guilty, if anything, of only an honest mistake in
judgment."

In other words, since the doctor's original examination did not
point out the latent condition which caused the operation to
fail and the patient to lose an eye, he should not be held respon3
sible for a failure to disclose this risk when it materialized.
The key question was not whether the physician "knew or
should have known" of the latent condition which caused the
operation to fail, but rather whether the risk that such condition could exist should have been disclosed to the patient.
Thus, by framing the question in the way it did, the Court sidestepped the real issue and declined to adopt either the material
risk or the medical community standard. The informed consent
statute was passed by the legislature 5 months after this deci54
sion was rendered.
52

Id.

51In an operation for a detached retina several years before, Mrs. Holton had a
hollow polyethylene ring or tube placed around the eye. Later this ring began to cause
the eye to deviate a little. Dr. Pfingst determined that it should be removed. This was
a relatively common procedure. Dr. Pfingst admitted that he was aware of cases when
the ring had perforated the sclera (the white membrane of the eye) making its removal
hazardous. However, his diagnosis did not reveal this condition to exist. In fact, the
ring had perforated the eye and its attempted removal by Dr. Pfingst resulted in Mrs.
Holton's loss of sight. The Court framed the issue in terms of whether the doctor failed
to disclose a condition he "knew or should have known" to exist. The real informed
consent question, however, should not focus on Dr. Pfingst's liability for a misdiagnosis. Rather it focuses on his admitted knowledge that a risk of perforation did exist
and his failure to disclose that risk to Mrs. Holton prior to the operation.
51 It might be that the Court, aware of legislative interest in this area, avoided the
disclosure standard issue pending action by the General Assembly.
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III.
A.

KENTUCKY'S INFORMED CONSENT STATUTE

Interpretationof the Statute

Informed consent statutes passed by some states have not
adopted either the community medical standard or the material risk standard of disclosure as developed by case law.
Rather, they have sought to specify the contents of a written
consent form, which if signed, would create a statutory presumption that the patient consented with adequate information.55 The Kentucky Legislature did not follow this latter approach and instead addressed primarily the scope of disclosure
issue. 6 Subparagraph (1) of the statute requires the disclosure
to be "in accordance with the accepted standard of medical or
dental practice.

' 57

This clearly adopts the medical community

standard of adequate disclosure. 8
The real value of the medical community standard for the
physician is that it prevents him from being judged by any
standard of disclosure other than that which his own profession
See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.54 which states in part:
Written consent to a surgical or medical procedure or course of procedures shall, to the extent that it fulfills . . . this section, be presumed to be
valid and effective, in the absence of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the person who sought such consent was not acting in good faith,
or that the execution of the consent was induced by fraudulent misrepresentation of material facts ....
KRS § 304.40-320 provides:
In any action brought for treating, examining, or operating on a claimant wherein the claimant's informed consent is an element, the claimant's.
informed consent shall be deemed to have been given where:
(1) The action of the health care provider in obtaining the consent of
the patient or another person authorized to give consent for the patient was
in accordance with the accepted standard of medical or dental practice
among members of the profession with similar training and expeience; and
(2) A reasonable individual, from the information provided by the
health care provider under the circumstances, would have a general understanding of the procedure and medically or dentally acceptable alternative
procedures or treatments and substantial risks and hazards inherent in the
proposed treatment or procedures which are recognized among other-health
care providers who perform similar treatments or procedures;
(3) In an emergency situation where consent of the patient cannot
reasonably be obtained before providing health care services, there is no
requirement that a health care provider obtain a previous consent.
KRS § 304.40-320(1) (Supp. 1976).
See text accompanying notes 33-39 supra.
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has created.59 A patient's or jury's view of what facts are needed
to make an informed choice is not relevant. Subparagraph (2),
however, seriously limits this legal protection of the physician
because it requires that a "reasonable individual," after hearing the disclosure dictated by medical custom, must have a
"general understanding" of alternatives and the "substantial"
risks and hazards inherent in the treatment." "Substantial"
risks are those that are recognized as such by other physicians
performing similar treatments or procedures.
Prior to the subparagraph (2) qualifications, a physician
could escape liability if he made a disclosure comparable to
that which other physicians made in similar circumstances,
even if the disclosure did not give the "reasonable individual"
enough facts to understand the risks and alternatives. To the
extent that the "reasonable individual" test in subparagraph
(2) focuses on the informational needs of the patient, it more
nearly reflects a policy compromise between the medical com-

munity and the material risk standard."'
Under this hybrid standard created by subparagraph (2),
the jury may be faced with at least three major factual questions: (1) What is the medical community standard under the
circumstances? (2) did the defendant-physician meet this
standard of disclosure? and (3) even if the defendant-physician
met this standard of disclosure, does the standard itself satisfy
the "reasonable individual" test of subparagraph (2)? It would
seem to follow that these findings of fact would be derived from
a hybrid evidentiary standard; that is, expert testimony would
establish the medical community standard in the first instance, and lay testimony would be sufficient to determine
whether that standard met the "reasonable individual" test.62
Id.
The Florida Medical Consent Law of 1975, which is virtually identical to the
Kentucky law, has been interpreted similarly. See note 70 infra.'
,t See text accompanying notes 33-47 supra.
" Likewise, an analyst of the New York informed consent law has interpreted that
law to create a comparable hybrid, or two-step, evidentiary requirement. See Note,
Informed Consent in New York Under the Medical Malpractice Insurance Act, 4
HoFsmA L. Rav. 701, 714. Also, it has been established in Kentucky that lay testimony
is sufficient in a medical malpractice action where the issue does not involve the
quality of the treatment given or where the negligence is obvious. See, e.g., Jarboe v.
Harting, 397 S.W.2d 775 (Ky. 1965); Neal v. Wilmoth, 342 S.W.2d 701 (Ky. 1961);
Butts v. Watts, 290 S.W.2d 777 (Ky. 1956).
60
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The final question raised by subparagraph (2) concerns the
precise meaning of "substantial risks." It is clear that these
risks are to be determined by expert testimony, but this would
be the case regardless of the standard of disclosure. The question is what factors make a risk "substantial"? Should one
focus solely on the probability that certain consequences could
occur or should one focus on the severity of the potential
consequences? For example, most people would consider a 5
percent chance of death to be a more substantial risk than a
50 percent chance of having to spend an extra night in the
hospital. The expert should be required, therefore, to classify
the risk as "substantial" based on potential severity as well as
probability of its occurrence. 3
Subparagraph (3) of the informed consent statute codifies
one of the basic defenses developed in case law to an informed
consent action. 4 In the event of an emergency where the patient may be unable to consent to the treatment, the physician
is not required to obtain any consent. 5
The Governor's Report: The Intent of the Legislature

B.

The Governor's Hospital and Physicians Professional Liability Insurance Advisory Committee which drafted the Act
explained the intent of each section of the Act in a report to
the Governor [hereinafter cited as the Governor's Report]." In
regard to the informed consent statute, the Governor's Report
states in full:
This section will legislatively require that "informed
consent" cases be proven by expert testimony relating to accepted standards of practice of the profession in providing
information, and further require that an objective standard
be applied in determining whether that information would
likely have resulted in any different decision by the plaintiff.
'9

See, e.g., Holland v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace Hosp., 522 P.2d 208, 212 (Ore.

1974).
See note 19 supra.
,3 Although many states have statutes which seek to protect the "good
Samaritan" who renders aid, studies have shown that "the legal risks in rendering
emergency medical care to accident victims in non-health care settings are minimal,
if not infintesimal." HEW REPoRT at 16.
"

"

GOVERNOR'S REPORT.
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The purpose of this section is to eliminate the possibility of
(1) a jury's speculating after the fact that the health care
provider would have told the plaintiff of a given risk even
though accepted professional standards would not require
such advance information, and (2) a plaintiff's testifying that
had he known of an unforeseeable or unlikely injury he would
not have consented to the recommended health care."
In view of the preceding interpretation of subparagraphs
(1) and (2), the intent of the drafters as stated in the Governor's
Report is not likely to be realized by the statute passed. First,
the Governor's Report indicates that the statute was intended
to make the medical community standard conclusive as to
whether the disclosure was adequate. "Jury speculation" with
respect to the adequacy of disclosure was to be eliminated. By
establishing a reasonable individual test in subparagraph (2),
however, the conclusiveness of the medical community standard is undercut. At best, a disclosure complying with the medical community standard would create a presumption of validity, subject to rebuttal if it could be shown that the disclosure
would not create a "general understanding" of the risks and
alternatives for the "reasonable individual." Ironically, then,
subparagraph (2) will create a disclosure issue for many juries.
A second purpose of the statute, according to the Governor's Report, is to require that an "objective standard be applied in determining whether [the disclosure of] information
would likely have resulted in any different decision by the
plaintiff." 8 Here the drafters have addressed the causation
issue 9 but there is no language in the statute concerning causation, much less any language which adopts an objective standard.70 Apparently, the drafters misunderstood that subtle dis61 Id. § HI, at 5.
6Id.

" See text accompanying notes 39, 44-45 supra.
70 Subparagraphs (3)(a)1 and (3)(a)2 of the Florida law are virtually identical to

subparagraphs (1) and (2) of the Kentucky law, yet the Florida legislators added an
additional subparagraph, (3)(b), in order to address the causation issue. Also, subparagraph (3)(a)2 of the Florida law has been interpreted similarly to subparagraph (2) of

the Kentucky statute. See, Note, The FloridaMedicalMalpracticeReform Act of 1975,
4 FLA. ST. L. Rav. 50, 71-72 (1976).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.132(3) (Supp. 1975), the Florida Medical Consent Law,
reads:

1976]
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tinction between showing a disclosure to be inadequate, on the
one hand, and proving it to be the cause of the injury on the
other.
IV.

CONCLUSION

With the increase of medical malpractice litigation in recent years, plaintiff's lawyers have developed many theories to
impose liability on the defendant-physician. One of the most
effective of these has been the doctrine of informed consent.
This doctrine has been criticized, however, as a catch-all
theory of liability that is argued only when plaintiff cannot
show any negligence on the part of the physician in the actual
performance of the treatment or procedure. 7 ' The 1976 Kentucky General Assembly passed a Medical Malpractice Insurance and Claims Act designed to preserve the availability of
reasonably priced liability insurance for the health care practitioner. In furtherance of this general objective the legislature
sought to create a standard for informed consent cases that
would minimize the plaintiffs' chances for success. Ironically,
however, the reasonable individual qualifications of subparagraph (2) of the statute may have the effect of allowing more
(3)
physician

No recovery shall be allowed in any court in this state against any
. . .

osteopath

. . .

chiropractor

. . .

podiatrist

. . .

or dentist

.. . in an action brought for treating, examining, or operating on a patient
without his informed consent when:
(a) 1. The action of the physician, osteopath, chiropractor, podiatrist,
or dentist in obtaining the consent of the patient. . . was in accordance with
an accepted standard of medical practice among members of the medical
profession with similar training and experience in the same or similar medical community; and
2. A reasonable individual from the information provided by the
physician, osteopath, chiropractor, podiatrist, or dentist under the circumstances would have a general understanding of the procedure, the medically
acceptable alternative procedures or treatments and substantial risks and
hazards inherent in the proposed treatments or procedures, which are recognized among other physicians, osteopaths, chiropractors, podiatrists, or dentists in the same or similar community who perform similar treatments or
procedures; or
(b) The patient would reasonably under all surrounding circumstances,
have undergone such treatment or procedure had he been advised by the
physician, osteopath, chiropractor, podiatrist, or dentist in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph (a).
11HEW REPORT at 29.

540

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65

plaintiffs to reach the jury than would have under the strict
medical community standard of disclosure. 2
J. Vaughan Curtis
72 Although the informed consent statute became law on July 1, 1976, it will not

be applicable to acts of malpractice which occurred before that date. Thus, those
informed consent cases to which the statute does not apply must be analyzed in terms
of whatever standards can be determined from the holding of the Kentucky Court of
Appeals in Holton v. Pfingst, 534 S.W.2d 786 (Ky. 1975). See text accompanying notes
47-52.

